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INTRODUCTION
In New York, an illogical and arbitrary common-law rule of evidence, the corroboration rule, governs the admissibility of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification. On one hand, the
New York Court of Appeals has correctly held that expert testimony regarding the factors that undermine an identification’s reliability (the identification’s cross-racial nature, for example) can provide “valuable” assistance to a jury.1 But on the other hand, the Court has repeatedly held that
a trial court can bar that expert testimony if it determines that the eyewitness identification is corroborated by “accura[te]” evidence.2 This is so,
the theory goes, because corroboration renders expert-identification testimony less “importan[t]” and renders it “reasonable” for a judge to conclude that the identification was accurate.3 Even testimony offered by a
witness with an obvious motive to lie (for example, a murder accomplice’s inculpatory testimony offered in exchange for a highly beneficial
plea deal) suffices to bar an identification expert.4
As shown below, the corroboration rule impairs the fact-finding process, violating the fundamental rule that jurors, not courts, assess the reliability and weight of the evidence. Under the corroboration approach,
courts usurp the jury’s power to resolve classic questions of fact: the identification’s reliability, the weight of the expert’s testimony, and the
strength of the so-called corroboration. In every other area of our law,
these classic factual questions are reserved for the jury. The corroboration
rule is an anomaly.
This Article proposes a change in the law. The Court of Appeals
should abandon its corroboration approach and instead hold, as the Connecticut and District of Columbia high courts have held,5 that the apparent
strength of the prosecution’s case is irrelevant to the admissibility of expert testimony challenging that case.
At its most fundamental level, the corroboration bar improperly conflates the weight of the expert’s testimony with its relevancy.6 To be sure,
evidence corroborating the identification—that is, evidence proving the
1

E.g., People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40, 45 (2006).
People v. McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d 1158, 1161-62 (2016); see also People v. Santiago,
17 N.Y.3d 661, 668-73 (2011); People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251, 266-69 (2009); People v.
LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 456 (2007); Young, 7 N.Y.3d at 44-46; People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157,
163 (2001).
3 Young, 7 N.Y.3d at 46.
4 McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d at 1161-62 (majority opinion), 1169-70 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
5 In re L.C., 92 A.3d 290, 297-99 (D.C. 2014); State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 738 &
n.44 (Conn. 2012).
6 See infra Section II(a).
2
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defendant committed the offense—may increase the identification’s reliability and, in turn, decrease the importance of an expert’s counter-testimony. But the identification’s accuracy and the apparent importance of
the defense expert’s testimony are quintessential jury questions that go to
the weight, not admissibility, of expert-identification testimony.7 The corroboration rule similarly ignores that it is the jury’s prerogative to determine whether the purported corroboration is accurate and thus reinforces
the identification’s reliability.8 Judges cannot make that call.
The anomalous corroboration rule creates serious doctrinal inconsistencies. No other class of experts—and certainly no prosecution experts—are barred because the adversary’s case seems strong.9 The corroboration rule also leads to arbitrary and unpredictable results, requiring
courts to determine whether the purported corroboration seems reliable
enough to bar expert-identification testimony.10 As a result, appellate decisions in this arena often look like summation battles, with judges debating, in fine detail, the corroboration’s reliability. That battle should be
reserved for the jury.
Common law aside, the corroboration rule violates the constitutional
right to present a complete defense under Holmes v. South Carolina11 and
the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to call witnesses in one’s
“favor.”12 Like the common law, the Constitution prohibits courts from
blocking material defense evidence because a judge finds the government’s evidence reliable or strong.
The Court of Appeals should abandon the corroboration rule and instead hold that the testimony of a qualified expert on eyewitness identifications is admissible if it satisfies the traditional standards governing all
other classes of expert testimony: (1) it is relevant; (2) its subject matter
is beyond a jury’s common knowledge; and (3) it is generally accepted as
reliable.13 The existence of corroborative evidence is irrelevant to the admissibility analysis.
7

See infra Section II(a)-(c).
See infra Section II(b).
9 See infra Section II(f).
10 See infra Section II(g).
11 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (striking down a rule of evidence that barred the defense from
presenting exculpatory evidence on the grounds that the prosecution’s case was strong).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13 See People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 422 (1994) (discussing the Frye standards for
reliability as applied to DNA expert testimony); People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 288 (1990)
(discussing standards for determining if an expert on rape trauma syndrome will be helpful to
the jury); De Long v. Cty. of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 307 (1983) (discussing when an expert is
appropriate); People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 50 (1979) (synthesizing a framework for determining whether an expert may testify); MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, NEW
YORK EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 7.2 (3d ed. 2017).
8
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I. AN ERA OF HOSTILITY TO IDENTIFICATION EXPERTS GIVES WAY TO A
MISGUIDED CORROBORATION STANDARD
Eyewitness testimony is “overwhelmingly influential.”14 “[T]here is
almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the
stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says ‘That’s the one!’”15 The
sheer number of convictions obtained in cases where a stranger’s identification was critical evidence confirms that jurors trust eyewitness identifications.16 Polling data confirms the same point.17
But because memory is unreliable and malleable, eyewitnesses often
get it wrong.18 In the last few decades, state and federal prosecutors have
convicted thousands of innocent people. In a significant number of those
cases, eyewitness identifications—later discovered to be inaccurate—
played a major role at the trial.19 For instance, of the 300-plus individuals
exonerated by DNA evidence since 1989, identifications played a role in
at least 69% of those cases.20

14 Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 n.4 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
15 Id. at 352.
16 See Alvin G. Goldstein et al., Frequency of Eyewitness Identification in Criminal
Cases: A Survey of Prosecutors, 27 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 71, 71 (1989) (“[A]ssuming
approximately 2,570,000 arrests in the U.S. each year, about 77,000 individuals are suspects
in cases in which the only critical evidence is eyewitness identification.”); see Bryan Scott
Ryan, Alleviating Own-Race Bias in Cross-Racial Identifications, 8 WASH. U. JURIS. REV.
115, 120-22, 122 n.30 (2015).
17 In one survey, 38% of participants responded that the phrase “I never forget a face”
applied “very well” to them, while 44% believed the same regarding the phrase “I have an
excellent memory.” Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors’ Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 207 tbl.3 (2006). Also,
18% of that survey’s participants believed that eyewitness identifications were “very reliable,”
while 15% believed they were “not very reliable” or “unreliable.” Id. at 207 tbl.4a. When told
to assume that the “eyewitness has no motivation to lie” and “genuinely believes” in the accuracy of their identification, 25% of participants said they considered eyewitness testimony
to be “very reliable,” while only 11% said they were “not very reliable” or “unreliable.” Id. at
207 tbl.4b.
18 E.g., Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 428 (Alaska 2016) (“[W]hile science has firmly
established the ‘inherent unreliability of human perception and memory,’ this reality is outside
‘the jury’s common knowledge,’ and often ‘contradicts jurors’ “commonsense” understandings.’”) (quoting United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2006)); DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://perma.cc/UF55-GQCH (last visited
January 15, 2021) (noting that 69% of DNA exonerations involve eyewitness misidentification).
19 See People v. Boone, 30 N.Y.3d 521, 527-28 (2017) (citing INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra
note 18).
20 INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 18.
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Scientists have grappled with this problem, isolating numerous factors that bear on the reliability of an eyewitness identification.21 As the
Connecticut Supreme Court has explained, “The extensive and comprehensive scientific research, as reflected in hundreds of peer reviewed
studies and meta-analyses, convincingly demonstrates the fallibility of
eyewitness identification testimony and pinpoints an array of variables
that are most likely to lead to a mistaken identification.”22 For example,
studies confirm a weak correlation between an eyewitness’s confidence
(such as a witness expressing absolute certainty about their identification)
and accuracy.23 And as eyewitnesses who “exude supreme confidence”
believe they are right, they “will not display the demeanor of the dishonest
or biased witness,” thus making it difficult to expose the truth through
cross-examination.24
Scientists have also established, though simulation studies and statistical analysis, that the following factors diminish an identification’s reliability:
●

the presence of a weapon (due to the tendency to focus on the
weapon instead of the suspect’s appearance);

●

high stress;

●

cross-racial bias (the suspect is a different race than the witness);

●

the passage of a brief period of time (as little as a few hours);

●

unconscious transference (a person seen in one context is confused with a person seen in another);

●

the failure to ensure that the person administering a lineup (or
other procedure) is unaware of the suspect’s identity (i.e.,
“double blind”);

●

the failure to inform the witness that the suspect may or may
not be in the lineup and that the witness need not identify
someone; and

21

Margaret A. Hagen & Sou Hee (Sophie) Yang, Criminal Defendants Have a Due Process Right to an Expert on Eyewitness Reliability: Why the Court Was Wrong in Perry v. New
Hampshire (2012), 26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 47, 130 app. A (2016); see, e.g., People v.
LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 453-55 (2007); State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 721 (Conn. 2012).
22 Guilbert, 49 A.3d at 721 (footnotes omitted).
23 Schmechel et al., supra note 17, at 198; People v. Santiago, 17 N.Y.3d 661, 672 (2011).
24 Boone, 30 N.Y.3d at 531 (quoting State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 889 (N.J. 2011)).
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contamination through exposure to post-crime information
(e.g., a witness reads that the suspect had black hair and incorporates that description into their memory, even if they did
not actually observe black hair).25

While this scientific research enjoys wide consensus, these findings
are “largely unfamiliar to the average person” and actually “counterintuitive.”26 Polling studies have confirmed that people routinely believe, for
instance, that an expression of confidence is strongly related to accuracy
or that a weapon’s presence increases identification accuracy.27 Many jurors similarly don’t know that stress or cross-racial distinctions undermine identification accuracy.28
Jurors can thus benefit from expert testimony regarding the impact
that certain factors have (or don’t have) on an identification’s accuracy.
Since the verdict will have a monumental impact on the accused, simple
fairness requires jurors to have access to relevant testimony that will help
them assess damaging testimony.29 But in New York, jurors rarely hear
such testimony because whenever the government has some evidence corroborating the identification, the trial court can block an identification expert.
***
The Court of Appeals has long held that a qualified expert’s testimony is admissible if it is: (1) relevant (as with all evidence); (2) helpful

25

E.g., id. at 528-29 (cross-racial bias); Guilbert, 49 A.3d at 721-23 (stress, weapon focus, cross-racial identification, diminished memory, absence of double-blind procedure, access to post-event or post-identification information about the event or identification, unconscious transference); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 904-10 (stress, weapon focus, duration, distance
and lighting, cross-racial bias, influence of private actors, speed of identification); John C.
Brigham et al., The Influence of Race on Eyewitness Memory, in 2 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS
PSYCHOLOGY 257 (R. C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2014) (cross-racial bias); Jonathan M. Fawcett
et al., Looking Down the Barrel of a Gun: What Do We Know About the Weapon Focus Effect?, 5 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 257, 258 (2016) (weapon focus); Saul M.
Kassin et al., On the “General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research: A New Survey
of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405 (2001) (surveying psychologists about 30 different
eyewitness phenomena).
26 Guilbert, 49 A.3d at 723; id. at 720 (“[There is] widespread judicial recognition that
eyewitness identifications are potentially unreliable in a variety of ways unknown to the average juror.”); see Third Circuit Task Force on Eyewitness Identifications, 2019 Report of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Task Force on Eyewitness Identifications,
92 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 23 (2019).
27 Schmechel et al., supra note 17, at 184, 196-97.
28 Id. at 197, 200.
29 Benn v. United States, 978 A.2d 1257, 1274 (D.C. 2009) (“Expert testimony can therefore be critical in helping to confirm—or undermine—a juror’s ‘near certitude’ of . . . guilt
when the prosecution’s case is grounded on the identification of eyewitnesses, and in furthering the truth-seeking purpose of a trial.”).
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to the jury—that is, it would inform the jury of something they “would
not ordinarily be expected to know already” (i.e., the helpfulness standard);30 and (3) generally accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific
community (i.e., the Frye standard).31
Applying these standards, New York courts have, for decades now,
ratified expert testimony in hundreds of contexts, finding that such testimony would help clarify a material factual question.32 Nevertheless,
throughout the 1990s, New York appellate courts routinely rejected expert testimony regarding eyewitness identifications, concluding that the
subject matter was within a jury’s common knowledge.33 A “position of
skepticism and hostility” dominated; “one opinion after another displayed
a distinct distaste for such testimony.”34
But in 2001, the Court of Appeals formally ended the categorical bar
to expert-identification testimony in People v. Lee.35 Unfortunately, Lee
effectively paved the way for New York courts to continue the trend of
precluding such testimony under an illogical corroboration rule.36
Lee considered whether the trial court had erred in blocking a concededly relevant expert on numerous identification factors, including
cross-racial identification, stress, and confidence.37 Applying the helpfulness standard, the Court held that expert-identification testimony would
aid the jury because the subject is beyond the jurors’ common
knowledge.38 As the Court explained, jurors are unaware of the “psychological studies regarding the accuracy of an identification.”39 And as the
Court confirmed a few years later, factors such as the cross-racial effect,
stress, and the relationship between eyewitness confidence and accuracy
are “counter-intuitive,” or “at least not so obvious or well known that ordinary jurors would not benefit from hearing them.”40

30

People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40, 45 (2006); People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 288 (1990).
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also People v. Wesley, 83
N.Y.2d 417, 422-23 (1994), De Long v. Cty. of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 307 (1983); People v.
Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 50 (1979).
32 MARTIN & CAPRA, supra note 13, at § 7.2.2.
33 E.g., People v. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d 827, 832 (1990) (Kaye, J., dissenting); People v.
Gibbs, 550 N.Y.S.2d 400, 400 (App. Div. 1990); People v. Knighton, 560 N.Y.S.2d 514, 516
(App. Div. 1990).
34 1 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 206.5 (8th ed. 2020).
35 96 N.Y.2d 157, 160 (2001).
36 Id. at 163.
37 Id. at 161.
38 Id. at 162.
39 Id.; see also People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 455 (2007).
40 People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40, 45 (2006).
31
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As for the Frye-general-acceptance standard, Lee held that expertidentification testimony is not, as a categorical matter, barred by Frye.41
Instead, when novel testimony is at issue, courts must conduct a hearing
to determine whether the testimony is generally accepted as reliable (the
Lee trial court had not done so because it rejected the expert on other
grounds).42
Having held that the helpfulness and Frye standards did not bar the
relevant expert testimony, Lee should have found the testimony admissible under longstanding common-law rules.43 Instead, apparently forging
a compromise between a categorical bar and the traditional relevancy
standard, the Court injected an artificial limitation on identification experts.44 Under Lee and its progeny, a trial court can—unlike with every
other class of expert testimony—reject an otherwise admissible and relevant identification expert if the judge believes the identification is corroborated by evidence bearing “strong indicia of accuracy.”45 Under this
standard, so long as a judge finds that some accurate evidence, beyond
the identification, proves the identity element of the offense, the accused
cannot challenge the identification with expert testimony.
In applying this corroboration rule, the Court of Appeals has set a
low bar, finding that even readily assailable evidence justifies expert preclusion:
●

an accomplice-cooperator’s testimony against a defendant accused of shooting a man in a barbershop (offered in exchange
for a favorable plea deal);46

●

a robbery defendant’s possession of a stolen vehicle months
after a gunpoint theft of that vehicle;47 and

41

Lee, 96 N.Y.2d at 162-63.
Id.
43 E.g., People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 287-88 (1990); People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d
40, 50 (1979).
44 Unfortunately, a few other state supreme courts have similarly chosen a middle ground
between a relevancy standard and a categorical bar, i.e., a corroboration rule. See People v.
McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1984) (en banc); Johnson v. State, 526 S.E.2d 549, 55253 (Ga. 2000); State v. DuBray, 77 P.3d 247, 255 (Mont. 2003). These decisions adopt a corroboration rule without explaining why the law of evidence permits it.
45 People v. Santiago, 17 N.Y.3d 661, 671 (2011); see also People v. McCullough, 27
N.Y.3d 1158, 1168 (2016); People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251, 266-68 (2009); People v.
LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 456 (2007) (“The trial court should weigh defendant’s request to
admit expert testimony against factors ‘such as the centrality of the identification issue and
the existence of corroborating evidence.’”) (quoting Lee, 96 N.Y.2d at 163); Young, 7 N.Y.3d
at 45-46.
46 McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d at 1163 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
47 Lee, 96 N.Y.2d at 160-61.
42
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testimony that a robbery defendant gave the stolen property
to two acquaintances days after the robbery.48

These cases are just a sample of the dozens of appellate decisions affirming the denial of an expert on corroboration grounds.49
The Court of Appeals has attempted to justify its corroboration rule
with a few sentences of conclusory analysis.50 Lee, which introduced the
rule, stated that corroboration is a “relevant factor” without explaining
why.51 The Court later reinforced the corroboration rule in Young, where
the complainant identified the defendant even though the suspect had obscured his face with a scarf (revealing only his eyes, forehead, and part of
his nose).52 Young recognized that the proffered expert testimony regarding eyewitness confidence and cross-racial identification “[c]ertainly . . .
could have been valuable to a juror.”53 The Court even held that the proffered testimony was “counter-intuitive,” so the jury would benefit from
hearing it.54 Nevertheless, the trial court had the discretion to bar this helpful testimony because the identification was corroborated: the defendant’s
acquaintances testified that a month after the robbery, he gave them binoculars and gloves, the same property taken from a car parked outside the
robbery location.55 This corroborative evidence, the Court held, justified
expert preclusion for three related reasons: (1) it rendered it “reasonable”
for the “trial court to conclude” that the “identification was quite unlikely
to be mistaken”; (2) it “significantly diminishe[d]” the expert testimony’s
“importance”; and (3) it rendered the expert testimony an “unnecessary
distraction.”56 The Court did not attempt to explain why a court can usurp
the jury’s fact-finding role by (1) crediting the corroboration (before the

48

Young, 7 N.Y.3d at 46.
E.g., People v. Saunders, 111 N.Y.S.3d 445, 452 (App. Div. 2019) (holding that the
voice identification of a masked perpetrator was corroborated by the perpetrator’s “threatening
Facebook message” to the victim’s sister and blood-stained money in his possession); People
v. Smith, 869 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (App. Div. 2008) (finding “consciousness-of-guilt evidence
and partially incriminating statements to the police” were sufficient to corroborate defendant’s
guilt); see also People v. Granger, 997 N.Y.S.2d 466 (App. Div. 2014); People v. Page, 964
N.Y.S.2d 339 (App. Div. 2013); People v. Rodriguez, 949 N.Y.S.2d 441 (App. Div. 2012);
People v. Munnerlyn, 937 N.Y.S.2d 858 (App. Div. 2012); People v. Perez, 925 N.Y.S.2d 501
(App. Div. 2011); People v. Fernandez, 910 N.Y.S.2d 140 (App. Div. 2010).
50 McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d at 1161-62; People v. Oddone, 22 N.Y.3d 369, 379-80 (2013);
Young, 7 N.Y.3d at 46; Lee, 96 N.Y.2d at 163.
51 Lee, 96 N.Y.2d at 163.
52 Young, 7 N.Y.3d at 46 (Smith, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 45 (majority opinion).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 43, 45.
56 Id. at 46.
49
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jury does so) and then (2) assessing whether this credited evidence renders the identification accurate and expert testimony “[un]importan[t].”57
Nor did the Court explain why a testimony’s apparent “importance”—not
its relevancy—controls.
In People v. Oddone, the Court of Appeals offered new and internally
inconsistent justifications for its corroboration rule.58 In dicta, the Court
stated that expert-identification testimony is “collateral” because it “advis[es] the jury on how to evaluate the testimony of fact witnesses.”59 Two
sentences later, the Court explicitly recognized that judges do not “normally exclude relevant evidence merely because the case against the defendant is strong.”60 Nevertheless, the Court explained that New York
trial courts can do just that: “[T]he overall strength of the [government’s]
case is important [to the analysis] because where the eyewitness testimony is not crucial, expert testimony about the collateral issue of eyewitness reliability can be a harmful distraction.”61
Three years later in People v. McCullough,62 the Court again tinkered
with the corroboration rule’s underlying doctrinal justification.
McCullough involved a robbery and murder in a barbershop. The government alleged that after McCullough and two co-defendants entered the
barbershop, McCullough tried to lock the door.63 The group then ordered
the eyewitness and the murder victim to drop to the ground, demanded
money and drugs, and struck them with pistols.64 After they took $200
from the murder victim, one man (not McCullough) purportedly shot the
victim, killing him.65 The co-defendants and the shooter fled, but the
shooter returned and placed a gun over the eyewitness’s head, producing
a clicking sound (no shots were fired).66 After that, the group purportedly
entered a car and drove off.67
The accomplice getaway driver testified against McCullough at trial.
He claimed that he dropped McCullough and the co-defendants off by the
barbershop before the shooting, drove off with them moments later, and
later saw the group with guns and money.68 The accomplice initially

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id.
22 N.Y.3d 369 (2013).
Id. at 379.
Id.
Id.
27 N.Y.3d 1158 (2016).
Id. at 1159-60.
Id. at 1164 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1160 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1163 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
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failed to select McCullough from a photo array a month after the crimes.69
But, indicted for murder and facing a sentence of at least 25 years to life,
the accomplice later changed his tune, testifying against McCullough in
exchange for a robbery plea and a 10-year-flat sentence.70 Also at trial,
the eyewitness, a stranger to McCullough, identified McCullough as “the
last man to enter the barbershop.”71
The trial court blocked an identification expert because it found that
the eyewitness’s identification was corroborated by the accomplice’s testimony.72 McCullough was convicted of murder and sentenced to 25 years
to life in prison.
In a 4-3 decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.73 The Court held that corroboration is one of the “factors for trial
courts to consider in determining whether expert testimony on eye-witness identification ‘would aid a lay jury in reaching a verdict.’”74 In doing
so, the Court introduced a new theory: The helpfulness analysis, which
governs all expert testimony, does not merely consider whether the expert
will assist the jury by teaching it something it may not already know.75
Instead, it also considers the strength of the adversary’s evidence.
McCullough did not cite a single case adopting that theory.
McCullough then held, in conclusory fashion, that given the accomplice’s testimony, the “trial court was entitled to reject the expert testimony after balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial or otherwise harmful effects.”76 Again, the Court did not explain
how the trial court had “balanced” anything; indeed, the trial court had
barred the expert solely on corroboration grounds and did no balancing at
all.77
***
Ultimately, Lee and its progeny hold that a court can bar expert-identification testimony if the identification is not the only evidence against
the accused. The theory is that corroboration enhances the eyewitness

69

Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1165.
71 Id. at 1164.
72 Id. at 1160 n.* (majority opinion) (“The expert was expected to testify as to how the
level of violence, the length of the incident and the presence of a weapon could influence an
eyewitness’s ability to make an identification.”).
73 Id. at 1161-62.
74 Id. at 1161 (quoting People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157, 162 (2001)).
75 See, e.g., People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40, 45 (2006).
76 McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d at 1161.
77 Id.
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identification’s reliability and diminishes the importance of any expert
testimony challenging that identification.78
As established below, this line of cases asks the wrong questions,
ignores settled common-law doctrine, usurps the jury’s fact-finding function, and violates the Constitution. The Court of Appeals should abandon
its judge-made corroboration approach.
II.

THE COMMON-LAW CORROBORATION RULE SHOULD BE DISCARDED

A.

The corroboration rule ignores the relevancy standard.

It is longstanding public policy that jurors should have access to all
the relevant evidence so they can best determine the truth.79 The Court of
Appeals has thus repeatedly “reaffirmed the well-established rules that
evidence is relevant if it has any tendency in reason to prove any material
fact and that all relevant evidence is admissible at trial unless admission
violates some exclusionary rule.”80 Questions regarding the weight, importance, and reliability of the evidence are reserved for the jury.81
The corroboration rule ignores the relevancy standard. Instead of
simply assessing whether expert testimony is relevant to the identification’s reliability, the corroboration rule additionally requires a court to
consider whether, given the purported corroboration, the identification is
“unlikely to be mistaken,” thus diminishing the importance of responsive
expert testimony.82 But no common-law doctrine authorizes a trial court
to preclude relevant defense testimony on corroboration grounds.83 The
governing inquiry is relevancy, not “importance,” and certainly not importance given the adversary’s evidence. As the Connecticut Supreme
Court held in rejecting a corroboration rule, “the law of evidence does not

78

People v. Oddone, 22 N.Y.3d 369, 379 (2013); Young, 7 N.Y.3d at 46; Lee, 96 N.Y.2d

at 163.
79

People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 509 (1995); Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 44
(1964).
80 People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 241 (1987); see also People v. Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d
769, 777 (1988).
81 E.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 245 (2012) (“[T]he jury, not the judge,
traditionally determines the reliability of evidence.”); People v. Marte, 12 N.Y.3d 583, 589
(2009) (“[O]ur system relies on juries to assess the reliability of eyewitnesses, aided by crossexamination, by the arguments of counsel, and by whatever other evidence supports or contradicts the witnesses’ testimony.”); People v. Drake, 7 N.Y.3d 28, 34 (2006); People v. Batashure, 75 N.Y.2d 306, 309 (1990) (“[T]he quality and weight of the proof [are] reserved for
the trier of fact.”); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from
the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . .”).
82 Young, 7 N.Y.3d at 46.
83 In re L.C., 92 A.3d 290, 297-99 (D.C. 2014).
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grant trial courts the liberty to decide what evidence is admissible based,
either in whole or in part, on the strength of the [adversary’s] case.”84
Evidence corroborating the identification undermines the weight, not admissibility, of expert-identification testimony.85
Even worse, the corroboration rule is grounded in the theory that a
judge can block the defense from challenging a government eyewitness
because corroboration renders that eyewitness reliable. The corroboration
rule thus usurps the jury’s power to determine the identification’s accuracy—a quintessential jury question.86
If taken seriously, the corroboration approach would fundamentally
change New York evidence law. After all, barring a relevant identification
expert because the eyewitness seems reliable given corroboration is no
different than barring cross-examination of the eyewitness on the same
grounds (for example, cross-examination regarding eyesight or a prior
perjury conviction). In the cross-examination context, the theory would
be the same: The government’s evidence proves the eyewitness is reliable, so the cross-examination is a “harmful distraction.”87 But that is not
how a criminal trial works. No court has ever suggested (outside the identification-expert context) that a judge can canvass the evidence, deem the
government’s evidence reliable, and then bootstrap that reliability determination into a defense-witness-preclusion order. The Court of Appeals
even recognized that point in Oddone, stating that judges “do not normally exclude relevant evidence merely because the case against the defendant is strong.”88 But Oddone ignored that basic rule when it confirmed that courts can block expert testimony for that exact reason.89
Of course, a jury might ultimately find the eyewitness reliable or the
identification-expert testimony insignificant because the identification is
corroborated. But a judge lacks the authority to usurp the jury’s prerogative to make those calls.
In pinning admissibility to the apparent strength of the government’s
case, the corroboration rule confuses harmless error, a standard that only

84 State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 738 n.44 (Conn. 2012); accord In re L.C., 92 A.3d at
297 (“[C]orroborative evidence [is] irrelevant to the question of the admissibility of appellant’s proffered expert testimony . . . .”).
85 See e.g., In re L.C., 92 A.3d at 298-99; see generally Batashure, 75 N.Y.2d at 309
(finding that questions regarding the weight of evidence are reserved for the jury).
86 See e.g., Marte, 12 N.Y.3d at 589; Drake, 7 N.Y.3d at 34.
87 People v. Oddone, 22 N.Y.3d 369, 379 (2013).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 379-80.
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governs appeals, with trial-level admissibility.90 If the trial court erroneously precludes an identification expert, the government can defend the
conviction by showing harmless error, that is, its non-identification evidence was “overwhelming” and there was no reasonable possibility that
the expert preclusion impacted the verdict.91 The corroboration standard
poses an identical question: Given the non-identification evidence in the
case, would the identification expert likely be important to the jury?92 But
appellate courts apply harmless error after the jury has convicted the defendant. No one has ever argued that harmless-error analysis governs the
admissibility of evidence at the trial level.
B.

The corroboration rule usurps the jury’s prerogative to determine
whether the purported corroboration should be credited in the first
place.

Beyond ignoring that the weight of both the expert testimony and the
identification are classic jury questions, the corroboration rule ignores
that the reliability of the purported corroboration itself is a quintessential
jury question. To block defense evidence on corroboration grounds, a
judge must necessarily credit the purported corroboration. But in our system, a jury, not a judge, decides whether the government’s proof should
be credited.93 And the jury makes that call after hearing all the evidence.
The corroboration rule thus distorts the fact-finding process. After
all, a jury may reject the purported corroborative evidence or testimony,
thus rendering the eyewitness identification dispositive of the defendant’s
fate. For instance, the McCullough jury may have easily found the accomplice’s testimony placing the defendant at the homicide scene—offered in
exchange for a beneficial plea bargain94—incredible. And if the jury had
done that, the only remaining evidence was a stranger’s identification. If
the deliberations proceeded in that plausible manner, the defendant would
have had a compelling need for expert-identification testimony. But under

90

See, e.g., In re L.C., 92 A.3d at 299 (discussing how a corroboration rule conflates
harmless error analysis with admissibility analysis); Schmechel et al., supra note 17, at 190
(“Harmless error review by appellate courts can effectively ensure that convictions will survive in those rare cases where any expert testimony would truly have been unimportant to the
jury’s verdict. This appears to be the intent of some trial and appellate courts when applying
a corroboration rationale to exclude experts in cases where the evidence is in fact overwhelming; the courts are effectively saying that any exclusion of the expert testimony is harmless
because there was so much independent evidence supporting the guilt of the defendant.”).
91 E.g., People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 240-41 (1975).
92 See People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40, 46 (2006).
93 E.g., Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 330 (2006).
94 People v. McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d 1158, 1165 (2016) (Rivera, J., dissenting).
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the corroboration rule, Mr. McCullough was out of luck because a judge
decided that the accomplice’s testimony seemed accurate.
The corroboration rule also ignores that evidence can reinforce other
evidence—that is, a jury could find the purported corroboration (e.g., an
accomplice-cooperator’s testimony) more reliable because of the identification. In McCullough, for instance, the jury could have placed more
weight on the accomplice’s corroborative testimony because an eyewitness identified McCullough. But expert-identification testimony may
have caused the jury to doubt the identification and, in turn, the accomplice’s testimony too. Thus, by blocking an identification expert, a court
artificially enhances the corroboration’s probative value, increasing the
likelihood that the jury will credit it and convict.
The better approach is to stop tinkering with the jury’s deliberations
and allow it to hear relevant expert testimony, as the Appellate Division
did in People v. Evans, a false-confession expert case. Evans rejected the
government’s claim that the trial court’s preclusion of a false-confession
expert was permissible “in light of the overwhelming evidence corroborating the confession.”95 Evans held that courts cannot “ponder” a confession’s veracity by “comparing the details given in the confession with the
details contained in the witnesses’ testimony.”96 Instead, that issue is for
the jury, which can “consider the details of [a] confession, along with the
details described by the witnesses and decide whether the People met their
burden.”97 Evans is right. Because jurors—not judges—determine the
strength of the government’s evidence, judges cannot pin the admissibility of defense evidence to their assessment of the government’s case.
The Evans dissent claimed that a corroboration rule was necessary to
prevent the “floodgates” from opening up.98 This may very well be the
central argument of those who support the corroboration rule: without it,
the accused can introduce expert testimony whenever the government introduces a stranger’s identification into evidence. This argument reflects
a pernicious trend in our law: The government routinely seeks to nullify
an individual right with the “audacious” counter that—even if a “substantive analysis of law” mandates that right—courts should reject it because
individuals will assert the right too often.99 Although rarely openly described as such, this floodgates argument is (at least at face value) a cash
95

People v. Evans, 32 N.Y.S.3d 119, 121-124 (App. Div. 2016).
Id. at 123.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 133 (Tom, J.P., dissenting) (arguing that if a corroboration rule does not govern
the admissibility of false-confession-expert testimony, the “floodgates” “would open up”).
99 See Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1052-53,
1077 (2013) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,
15 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); accord Crooker v. TSA, 323 F. Supp. 3d 148, 157 (D.
96
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argument, rooted in the belief that we should limit rights because they
cost too much. Our courts are flooded with these floodgates arguments.100
Besides being a convenient cover for limiting individual liberty,101
this floodgates argument has no principled foundation, especially here.102
No legal principle allows a court to block the defense from challenging a
government witness because the government has opted to use that class
of witnesses (here, eyewitnesses) in many cases. Individual rights trump
whatever money or time we gain by blocking expert testimony in the few
cases where defendants bypass a coercive plea regime and demand a trial.
A too-many-defense-witnesses problem pales in comparison to the more

Mass. 2018) (“The floodgates argument is frequently raised with but vague meaning and few
facts to support its sometimes-shaky foundations.”).
100 E.g., Levy, supra note 99, at 1022 (explaining that floodgates arguments are frequently
advanced in our courts).
101 Blackstone recognized the obvious point that it is easier to limit rights by relying on
pretexts, such as floodgates concerns, instead of openly challenging rights themselves. United
States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2384 (2019) (plurality opinion) (“In what now seems a
prescient passage, Blackstone warned that the true threat to trial by jury would come less from
‘open attacks,’ which ‘none will be so hardy as to make,’ as from subtle ‘machinations, which
may sap and undermine i[t] by introducing new and arbitrary methods.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 298, 343
(1769)). Judges and scholars have recognized that point in the “floodgates” context, observing
that the floodgates argument can serve as a pretext to limit rights. E.g., Levy, supra note 99,
at 1074 (“[Supreme Court] justices often invoke floodgates arguments without much support
for why they believe a large number of cases will come . . . . Of course, it can be easy to hide
one’s claims behind this kind of hyperbole—and there is reason to suspect that parties and
justices have invoked this language at times precisely because, in the words of Justice Powell,
a ‘floodgates’ argument can be easy to make and difficult to rebut.’”) (quoting Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 304 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)); Tim Bain, The Wrong Tort in the
Right Place: Avenues for the Development of Civil Privacy Protections in New Zealand, 22
CANTERBURY L. REV. 297, 304 (2016) (referring to the floodgates argument as “that ubiquitous excuse for judicial conservativism”); Toby J. Stern, Federal Judges and Fearing the
“Floodgates of Litigation,” 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 412 (2003).
102 See Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2384; see also People v. Tiger, 32 N.Y.3d 91, 118 (2018)
(Wilson, J., dissenting) (“‘[C]onservation of judicial resources’ does not appear alongside
‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.’”); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979)
(“Judicial resources, I am well aware, are increasingly scarce these days. Nonetheless, when
we automatically close the courthouse door solely on this basis, we implicitly express a value
judgment on the comparative importance of classes of legally protected interests. And current
limitations upon the effective functioning of the courts arising from budgetary inadequacies
should not be permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of otherwise sound constitutional
principles.”) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 61516 (1969) (“[P]roliferation of claims” does not justify a refusal to change the law; although
“extra litigation” may result from the change, that is “no reason for a court to eschew a measure of its jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 56 (5th ed. 1984) (“It is the business of the law to remedy
wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a ‘flood of litigation.’”).
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fundamental problem of too many innocent defendants sitting in prison
due to mistaken identifications.
Ultimately, the fact that courts are currently precluding many defendants from introducing valuable and material evidence in many cases
is a reason to change the law, not to maintain the status quo.103 Any fear
of too many defense witnesses seems to be grounded in a fear of “too
much justice.”104
C. The Court of Appeals’s vague theory that an identification expert is
“collateral” also fails to justify the corroboration rule.
In Oddone, the Court suggested, for the first time, that expert testimony is “collateral” because it “advis[es] the jury on how to evaluate the
testimony of fact witnesses.”105 This argument fails for a few reasons.
By claiming that this class of expert testimony is collateral, Oddone
was ultimately suggesting that, although relevant, expert-identification
testimony generally has remote relevance.106 But this vague, “collateral”
point has nothing to do with corroborative evidence. Even if the government’s case rests entirely on identification testimony, expert testimony is
still, under Oddone’s theory, collateral because it helps the jury evaluate
other testimony.
More importantly, expert-identification testimony cannot be styled
“collateral” under the theory that it has some remote connection to the

103

See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 917 n.3 (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (“To the extent that
this argument shades into the contention that such claims should be denied because otherwise
courts would experience a ‘flood of litigation,’ we point out that courts are responsible for
dealing with cases on their merits, whether there be few suits or many; the existence of a
multitude of claims merely shows society’s pressing need for legal redress.”); Tobin, 24
N.Y.2d at 615-16; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 102.
104 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
Schmechel, et al., supra note 17, at 190 (“Ending reliance on corroborating evidence will admittedly lead to the admission of expert testimony in many more cases. But this is a natural
product of the adversarial system in which juries and not judges should resolve disputed questions about the reliability of a piece of government proof. Courts need not fear that such a
regime would necessarily invalidate convictions in cases where judges erroneously exclude
expert testimony. Harmless error review by appellate courts can effectively ensure that convictions will survive in those rare cases where any expert testimony would truly have been
unimportant to the jury’s verdict.”).
105 People v. Oddone, 22 N.Y.3d 369, 379 (2013).
106 Id. (“On the other hand, applications to admit evidence of this kind—in essence, testimony by an expert witness advising the jury on how to evaluate the testimony of fact witnesses—must be approached with caution. Such testimony is collateral to the main issues in
the case, and we have warned that the exploration of collateral issues tends ‘to obscure the
main issue in the minds of the jury, to lead them away from the principal matters which require
their attention and to protract trials to an unreasonable extent without any corresponding advantage to any one concerned.’”) (quoting People v. Harris, 209 N.Y. 70, 82 (1913)).
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case. An identification expert squarely undermines testimony (an eyewitness identification) that is often essential to the government’s case, as it
was in every case discussed above where the Court of Appeals applied
the bar. It is hard to see how informative testimony that undermines dispositive prosecution testimony can somehow be labelled “collateral.”
And of course, if expert testimony were collateral because it helps
the jury “evaluate the testimony of fact witnesses,”107 large swaths of expert testimony could be precluded on that tenuous ground. For instance,
expert testimony that the complainant’s behavior is consistent with rape
trauma or child abuse—commonly introduced by the government—
would be collateral and thus subject to a corroboration rule.108 But none
of this testimony is subject to a corroboration rule. Oddone’s analysis ignores that helping the jury evaluate the facts is not some kind of inferior
expert role. Instead, it is an expert’s core function.
D. Corroboration is irrelevant to the helpfulness standard governing
all experts.
Still searching for a doctrinal justification for the corroboration approach the Court of Appeals created 15 years earlier, the McCullough
Court (in 2016) tried to shoehorn the corroboration factor into the broader
question of “whether expert testimony on eye-witness identification
‘would aid a lay jury in reaching a verdict.’”109 This effort fails too.
Although McCullough cited Lee for this new justification, Lee held
no such thing. Lee correctly held that the expert testimony’s subject matter must “aid the jury”—that is, it must convey information beyond a lay
person’s common knowledge.110 That holding is consistent with
longstanding case law, which in assessing the helpfulness standard, has
considered whether the testimony was beyond the “ken of the typical juror,”111 not whether it would assist the jury in light of the strength of the
107

Id.
People v. Carroll, 95 N.Y.2d 375, 387 (2000) (“We have long held that expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome, abused child syndrome or similar conditions may be
admitted to explain behavior of a victim that might appear unusual or that jurors may not be
expected to understand.”).
109 People v. McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d 1158, 1161 (quoting People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157,
162 (2001)).
110 Lee, 96 N.Y.2d at 162 (“Despite the fact that jurors may be familiar from their own
experience with factors relevant to the reliability of eyewitness observation and identification,
it cannot be said that psychological studies regarding the accuracy of an identification are
within the ken of the typical juror.”).
111 E.g., People v. Rivers, 18 N.Y.3d 222, 228 (2011) (quoting De Long v. Cty of Erie, 60
N.Y.2d 296, 307 (1983)); People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40, 45 (2006) (“As we made clear in
Lee, a court’s exercise of discretion in a case like this depends in large part on whether the
‘specialized knowledge’ of the expert can give jurors more perspective than they get from
108

80

CUNY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:62

adversary’s case. “The fact that the identification was corroborated is irrelevant to the pertinent [helpfulness] question, which is whether the scientific subject matter of [the expert’s] testimony was beyond the ken of
the average layperson.”112
E.

The corroboration rule is onerous.

The corroboration rule is a harsh bludgeon that “unfairly restrict[s]
the defendant’s opportunity to mount a defense.”113 Under the rule, a defendant cannot present expert-identification testimony unless the government’s case consists of nothing but an identification. Even a witness with
an obvious motive to lie, like the cooperator in McCullough (who received a significant sentence reduction in exchange for his testimony),
satisfies the corroboration rule.114 “If expert testimony was not allowed in
[McCullough], one can hardly imagine an occasion where corroborating
evidence is more unreliable such that the expert testimony would be held
admissible.”115 Ultimately, because the government will rarely rely exclusively on an identification, defendants will rarely overcome this harsh
barrier.
Even the appellate harmless error standard—mistakenly converted
by the Court of Appeals into a free-standing rule of admissibility in this
context—is not so harsh. To show harmless error, the government must
prove overwhelming evidence.116 But the corroboration standard merely
requires any evidence which, if credited, corroborates guilt.117 For instance, a robbery defendant’s possession of the stolen property months
‘their day-to-day experience, their common observation and their knowledge.’ In other words,
could the expert tell the jury something significant that jurors would not ordinarily be expected
to know already?”) (citations omitted); People v. Cronin, 60 N.Y.2d 430, 433 (1983) (“It is
for the trial court in the first instance to determine when jurors are able to draw conclusions
from the evidence based on their day-to-day experience, their common observation and their
knowledge, and when they would be benefited by the specialized knowledge of an expert
witness.”).
112 Patterson v. United States, 37 A.3d 230, 250 n.30 (D.C. 2012) (Glickman, J., concurring) (emphasis added), concurring opinion subsequently withdrawn, 56 A.3d 1152 (D.C.
2012); see also In re L.C., 92 A.3d 290, 298-99 (D.C. 2014) (“[T]he criterion of helpfulness
is not a grant of authority to the trial judge to exclude relevant and otherwise admissible expert
testimony merely because it is against the expected weight of the evidence.”).
113 State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 738 (Conn. 2012).
114 McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d at 1161, 1165-66 (2016) (holding that an accomplice cooperator’s testimony was sufficient corroboration where accomplice was facing 25 years to life on
a murder charge and testified against the defendant in exchange for a 10-year sentence on a
robbery conviction); Karianne M. Polimeni, New York on Eyewitness Identifications: Progressive or Regressive?, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 660 (2018).
115 Polimeni, supra note 114, at 660.
116 People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241 (1975).
117 People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157, 162-63 (2001).
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after the robbery satisfies the corroboration standard.118 While that inconclusive evidence would not justify affirmance on harmless error
grounds,119 it nevertheless justifies blocking the expert from testifying at
the trial level.
The Court’s approach to balancing prejudice and probative value in
this area also unfairly stacks the deck against defendants. McCullough
held that a court must determine whether the expert testimony’s potential
for prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.120 But the Court
has taken one single factor (corroboration) and placed it on both sides of
the scales. Under Lee and its progeny, expert testimony (1) has minimal
probative value because the identification is corroborated and (2) is purportedly prejudicial (i.e., a “distraction”) for exactly the same reason.121
This double dipping ensures that any judge interested in blocking this testimony can do so with ease and then immunize the decision from appellate
review under an abuse-of-discretion standard. As a result, the longstanding categorical bar of expert-identification testimony (formally rejected
by Lee),122 can live on under the guise of discretionary balancing.
F.

The corroboration rule is an anomaly.

In no other area of New York law does a court assess the admissibility of evidence by analyzing the strength of the adversary’s case. The rule
is an anomaly.
Even worse, this anomalous rule only targets defense experts. No
court has ever suggested, let alone held, that a court can block a government expert because the defense theory is corroborated. For example,
courts have not barred the government from presenting expert testimony
on child abuse accommodation syndrome,123 rape trauma syndrome,124 or
drug-dealing practices125 because the defense’s counter-theory is corroborated by significant evidence. The arbitrary corroboration jurisprudence
is thus a one-way ratchet that favors only the government. As Professor
118

Id. at 161-63.
Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d at 240-41.
120 People v. McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d 1158, 1161 (2016).
121 People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40, 46 (2006); see McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d at 1161; People
v. Oddone, 22 N.Y.3d 369, 379 (2013).
122 Lee, 96 N.Y.2d at 162-63.
123 See People v. Spicola, 16 N.Y.3d 441, 465 (2011) (permitting expert testimony that
certain behaviors by a child are consistent with sexual abuse).
124 See People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 292 (1990) (admitting expert testimony regarding
rape trauma syndrome because it can “assist jurors in reaching a verdict by dispelling common
misperceptions about rape.”).
125 See People v. Hicks, 2 N.Y.3d 750, 751 (2004) (citing People v. Brown, 97 N.Y.2d
500, 505 (2002)) (holding that an expert can testify about factors consistent with narcotics
sales, such as the packaging and quantity of drugs).
119
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Risinger has explained, the judiciary’s willingness to permit the government to educate the jury regarding certain behaviors (e.g., rape trauma
syndrome and drug-dealing practices) while barring similar defense efforts reflects an anti-defense bias.126 “Something is wrong with this picture.”127
As the Court of Appeals has confirmed, “one of the essential ingredients of due process of law is reciprocity.”128 Thus, the government cannot adopt rules that benefit the government while depriving the accused
of those same benefits.129 Lee and its progeny ignore that core principle.
G. The corroboration rule produces arbitrary results.
The corroboration rule is inherently subjective, requiring judges, like
jurors, to assess the totality of the government’s case. Predictably, this
subjective standard produces arbitrary results as judges cannot employ it
consistently. As one article aptly put it, the corroboration approach
“clearly places too much discretion in the hands of the judge, so much so
that [it] is not a protection at all, but rather a gamble.”130
Again, McCullough, the barbershop murder case, best demonstrates
the point.131 There, the only evidence corroborating the stranger’s identification was the accomplice-cooperator’s testimony that he dropped
McCullough off at the barbershop and drove him away after the shooting.
Before trial, McCullough proffered expert testimony regarding numerous
identification factors, such as weapon focus.132 The trial court blocked the
expert because the accomplice-cooperator’s testimony was “sufficient
corroboration.”133 Mr. McCullough was convicted.
Three Appellate Division justices then found the corroboration insufficient because the accomplice was a “liar” who only identified Mr.
McCullough after he was promised a beneficial plea bargain.134 Further,
the accomplice “had never met defendant prior to the robbery,” “remained

126 D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 131-32 (2000).
127 Id. at 135.
128 People v. Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d 769, 776 (1988) (citing Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470,
472 (1973)).
129 Wardius, 412 U.S. at 470-75 (holding that due process barred the State from forcing
the defendant to provide discovery while depriving the defendant of reciprocal discovery
rights since “discovery must be a two-way street”).
130 Polimeni, supra note 114, at 660.
131 People v. McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d 1158 (2016).
132 Id. at 1160 n.*.
133 Id. at 1160.
134 People v. McCullough, 5 N.Y.S.3d 665, 668 (App. Div. 2015).
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in the vehicle during the robbery,” and had a limited opportunity to observe the shooter.135
The Appellate Division dissenters had a different view, finding the
accomplice’s testimony “reliable” because it was “very detailed.”136 The
dissent concluded that the accomplice’s testimony “harmonized with the
eyewitness’s testimony in such a manner as to furnish the necessary” corroboration.137
In the Court of Appeals, a four-judge majority found that the trial
court correctly blocked the expert on corroboration grounds.138 The majority found that given the corroboration, “the trial court was entitled to
reject the expert testimony after balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial or otherwise harmful effects.”139
In dissent, Judge Rivera (joined by two other judges) concluded that
the accomplice’s testimony “lack[ed] ‘the strong indicia’ necessary to
sufficiently corroborate” the identification.140 The dissent did not trust the
accomplice because he initially implicated others in the offense without
mentioning McCullough.141 While the accomplice claimed he did not initially reference McCullough because “he did not know everything about
what happened,” the dissent found that excuse “unbelievable given [the
accomplice’s] role as the getaway driver.”142 But even if this “was a tenable excuse, it would not outweigh the other circumstances pointing to his
unreliability.”143
McCullough proves just how arbitrary the corroboration rule is. The
flawed rule requires judges to participate in what ultimately amounts to a
subjective summation battle regarding the apparent strength of the government’s case.
The dissent in McCullough, however, is perhaps just as flawed as the
majority’s opinion because it reinforces the mistaken belief that judges
have the right to pin the admissibility of defense evidence to their opinion
about the strength of the government’s case. Indeed, even if judges could
gauge corroboration with some level of consistency, that would not matter. The core vice of the corroboration rule is not unworkability, but rather
its violation of the basic rule that “the law of evidence does not grant trial
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137 Id. at 1458 (internal quotation marks omitted).
138 McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d at 1161.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1171 (Rivera, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Santiago, 17 N.Y.3d 661, 671
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courts the liberty to decide what evidence is admissible based, either in
whole or in part, on the strength of the [adversary’s] case.”144 The solution, therefore, is to stop considering corroboration altogether, not to try
to improve the standard or narrow its reach.145 The Court of Appeals
should take that step and hold that the strength of the government’s case
is irrelevant to the admissibility of a defense expert.
III. THE CORROBORATION RULE IS ALSO UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Precluding a relevant identification expert because a judge finds the
government’s evidence strong is also unconstitutional, violating the constitutional rights to present a complete defense and compulsory process.146
The “Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’”147 “This right is abridged by
evidence rules that infringe upon a weighty interest of the accused and are
arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
serve.”148 The Supreme Court has not specifically clarified which
Amendment establishes the complete-defense right, instead explaining
that it is either rooted in the Due Process, Compulsory Process, or Confrontation Clauses.149
In Holmes v. South Carolina, the Supreme Court applied its complete-defense jurisprudence to a South Carolina rule that barred evidence
of third-party guilt if a judge found the government’s evidence
“strong.”150 There, the South Carolina courts blocked evidence that another person had committed the offense because the government’s case,
which consisted of DNA evidence, was otherwise compelling.151 Under
the South Carolina rule, the trial judge “does not focus on the probative
value or the potential adverse effects of admitting the defense evidence of
third-party guilt.”152 Instead, like the New York corroboration rule,
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State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 738 n.44 (Conn. 2012).
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146 See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
147 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324 (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).
148 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The critical inquiry concerns the strength of the prosecution’s
case: If the prosecution’s case is strong enough, the evidence of
third-party guilt is excluded even if that evidence, viewed independently, would have great probative force and even if it would
not pose an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of
the issues.”153
The South Carolina rule embraced the following logic: “[S]trong evidence” of guilt renders the defense’s third-party evidence “weak.”154
A unanimous Supreme Court held that this state evidentiary rule violated the right to present a complete defense because it was arbitrary and
illogical.155 The rule was illogical because “an accurate evaluation of the
prosecution’s proof, and the true strength of the prosecution’s proof cannot be assessed without considering challenges to the reliability of the
prosecution’s evidence.”156 Thus, while it may be true that “the prosecution’s evidence, if credited, would provide strong support for a guilty verdict,” that does not justify precluding exculpatory evidence because only
the jury can determine whether evidence should be “credited.”157 Indeed,
“where the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses or the reliability of
its evidence is not conceded, the strength of the prosecution’s case cannot
be assessed without making the sort of factual findings that have traditionally been reserved for the [jury].”158
The Court further held that the South Carolina rule was just as illogical as its converse, that is, “a rule barring the prosecution from introducing evidence of a defendant’s guilt if the defendant” presented evidence
that “if believed, strongly supports a verdict of not guilty.”159 By “evaluating the strength of only one party’s evidence, no logical conclusion can
be reached regarding the strength of contrary evidence offered by the
other side to rebut or cast doubt. Because the rule [here] did not heed this
point, the rule is ‘arbitrary.’”160
At its core, Holmes found it unconstitutional to preclude exculpatory
evidence under the theory that because the government’s case is strong,
the defense evidence is immaterial. Such an approach inverts the basic
structure of our jury system: Jurors assess the reliability of the government’s evidence and weigh it against the defense’s evidence after hearing
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the relevant evidence. A court cannot put its thumb on the scales by (1)
weighing the evidence; (2) reaching a “conclusion on its own about factually who committed the crime”; and then (3) shaping “the evidence the
jury hear[s] to conform the verdict to the trial court’s factual conclusion.”161
As several courts and judges have suggested162—but the Court of
Appeals has not yet addressed—Holmes invalidates a rule barring a defense expert because the government has evidence which, “if credited,
would provide strong support for a guilty verdict.”163 As Holmes explained, by “evaluating the strength of only [the government’s] evidence,
no logical conclusion can be reached regarding the strength of contrary
evidence”—here an exculpatory defense witness—offered “to rebut or
cast doubt.”164 And like the rule in Holmes, the corroboration rule ignores
that “the strength of the prosecution’s case cannot be assessed without
making the sort of factual findings that have traditionally been reserved
for the [jury].”165 Accordingly, the corroboration rule is arbitrary and violates the right to present a complete defense.166
A leading treatise notes that Holmes may “arguably” be distinguishable from the identification-expert context because third-party-guilt evidence (at issue in Holmes) proves “innocence” while expert-identification
testimony “merely casts general doubts on one aspect of the state’s
case.”167 This suggestion rests on a distinction between evidence that undermines the reliability of the government’s evidence and evidence that
completely disposes of the government’s case (such as third-party-guilt
evidence).
This distinction fails under the logic of Holmes. Holmes precludes
courts from excluding defense testimony on the grounds that since the
161 Kenneth S. Klein, Why Federal Rule of Evidence 403 Is Unconstitutional, and Why
That Matters, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1077, 1119-20 (2013) (analyzing Holmes).
162 See In re L.C., 92 A.3d 290, 299 n.30 (D.C. 2014) (“Indeed, Holmes makes clear that
a rule of evidence allowing a trial judge to exclude a defendant’s relevant and otherwise admissible expert testimony when the prosecution’s evidence of the defendant’s guilt is strong
would contravene the constitutional guarantee of ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’”) (quoting Holmes, 547 U.S. at 331); cf. People v. Santiago, 900 N.Y.S.2d 273,
284 n.4 (App. Div. 2010) (McGuire, J., concurring) (stating that the question of whether reliance on corroboration as a justification for barring an expert “is consistent with Holmes . . . is
unclear.”); see also State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 738 n.44 (Conn. 2012) (stating, without
resolving the constitutional question, that denying an expert on corroboration grounds would
inhibit a defendant from mounting a complete defense).
163 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 330.
164 Id. at 331.
165 Id. at 330.
166 Id. at 330-31.
167 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 61:36 (7th ed.
2019).
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government’s case seems strong, any contrary defense evidence must be
weak.168 Holmes thus prohibits a particular justification for barring defense evidence; it is not concerned with how important the evidence is to
the defense. The significance of the proffered testimony is relevant to
harmless error on appeal, not trial-level admissibility under the Constitution.
The Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause also dooms
New York’s corroboration approach.169 The Clause guarantees that in all
criminal cases, “the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.” Although the Clause’s text
only formally addresses the right to compel a favorable witness’s attendance, the Supreme Court has held that the Clause covers the broader right
to call favorable witnesses.170 As the Court held in Washington v. Texas,
the framers “did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had
no right to use.”171
Under the Compulsory Process Clause, a defendant has the right to
call an identification expert regardless of corroboration because that witness will testify in “his favor.”172 Only by rewriting the Clause could we
bar favorable defense witnesses on the grounds that a judge finds the government’s evidence reliable. The Clause guarantees the right to call witnesses in the defendant’s favor. It does not empower a judge to eliminate
that right because the judge looks “favorably” upon the government’s evidence.
Crawford v. Washington,173 a Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause case, confirms the Sixth Amendment violation here.174 Crawford
held that “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously
reliable is akin to dispensing with a jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”175
Under Crawford’s Sixth Amendment logic, the corroboration rule
violates the Compulsory Process Clause. Just as courts cannot block confrontation of a government witness because that witness is “reliable,” they
also cannot block defendants from attacking a witness through compulsory process on that same nebulous ground.
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Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,176 another Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause case, drives home the point. There, Massachusetts argued that a defendant lacks the right to confront testimony that a substance is cocaine because the Confrontation Clause only covers testimony
that, “taken alone,” proves guilt.177 Under that approach, the accused
could not confront a forensic analyst’s testimony that a substance is cocaine. That testimony, “taken alone,” does not prove guilt without additional evidence connecting the accused to that substance.178
Melendez-Diaz soundly rejected this formalism.179 As the Court
held, the Sixth Amendment’s twin rights to confront “witnesses” and call
“favor[able]” witnesses “contemplate[ ] two classes of witnesses—those
against the defendant and those in his favor. The prosecution must produce the former; the defendant may call the latter . . . . [T]here is not a
third category of witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.”180 Accordingly, the importance of the testimony under attack—i.e., whether it is just “part of” the government’s case
or whether it “alone” “suffice[s] to convict”—is irrelevant.181
Similar analysis nullifies the corroboration rule. There is no category
of defense witnesses who are favorable to the defense but “immune from”
compulsory process because they challenge prosecution testimony that
does not constitute the government’s entire case.182 On the contrary, a defendant has the right to employ the Sixth Amendment’s protections
against inculpatory testimony regardless of that testimony’s apparent centrality to the government’s case.183
If the government wants to prevent the accused from challenging a
witness with a relevant counter-witness, it can decline to call the inculpatory witness to the stand. But the Constitution bars the government from
presenting that inculpatory witness to the jury and then tying the defendant’s hands.
IV. THE BETTER APPROACH: A RETURN TO COMMON-LAW STANDARDS
OF EVIDENCE
The common-law and constitutional analysis articulated above does
not preclude a court from barring or limiting expert-identification testimony when its probative value is “substantially outweighed” by a serious
176
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risk of undue prejudice, such as jury confusion.184 That rule governs all
relevant and material testimony. So, if the defense insists that expert testimony regarding weapon focus will require a deep dive into complex statistics, a court could find that the testimony’s potential for confusion substantially outweighs its probative value. What courts cannot do, however,
is credit the government’s non-identification evidence, find sufficient corroboration, identify nothing prejudicial or confusing about the expert testimony, and then bar the expert on corroboration grounds alone. That is
precisely what the Court of Appeals has permitted for the last 20 years.
And that is what should end.
In assessing whether expert testimony should be barred because its
probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential for prejudice,
courts must exercise serious care. First, wholesale “rejection of expert
testimony is the exception rather than the rule.”185 That approach is consistent with two core principles: (1) jurors should have access to relevant
evidence that enhances the truth-seeking function of the trial;186 and (2)
experts can play an important role in a trial by clarifying the evidence.187
Second, “[a] court’s discretion in evidentiary rulings is circumscribed by the rules of evidence and the defendant’s constitutional right
to present a defense.”188 At a minimum, that principle requires trial courts
to specifically articulate a significant impediment to the trial’s truth-seeking function before barring an expert. Clichés like “this scientist will distract the jury” fail as they are general claims that fail to identify a specific
impediment to the truth-seeking function. “[I]n order for a [trial] court to
exclude scientific evidence, there must be something particularly confusing [or otherwise prejudicial] about the scientific evidence at issue—
something other than the general complexity of scientific evidence.”189
Third, courts must consider alternatives to wholesale preclusion,
such as limitations on expert testimony. For example, if a defendant proffers expert testimony that involves complex statistical data, courts can address a confusion concern by limiting the expert testimony to the conclusion itself. It will be the rare case where the expert’s bottom-line
184

People v. Jin Cheng Lin, 26 N.Y.3d 701, 727 (2016) (citations omitted); see Holmes v.
South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326-27 (2006).
185 In re Wholesale Grocery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 946 F.3d 995, 1001 (8th Cir. 2019).
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conclusion and a brief description of the underlying scientific theory or
experiments will be so confusing that a court could reasonably choose
wholesale preclusion over careful limitation.
CONCLUSION: PEOPLE V. BOONE PROVIDES SOME HOPE FOR REFORM
The Court of Appeals should abolish the anomalous corroboration
rule. This important change will ensure that before convicting an individual, the jury learns valuable testimony. That’s what’s supposed to happen
in a jury system.
People v. Boone,190 which addressed the right to an instruction on
cross-racial identifications, may provide some hope for reform. There, the
Court of Appeals held that a trial court must instruct the jury regarding
the unreliability of cross-racial identifications whenever the “identification of the defendant is at issue” and “the identifying witness and defendant appear to be of different races.”191 Although the Court mentioned New
Jersey precedent that had previously pinned the instruction to the absence
of corroboration,192 Boone rejected that approach, instead holding that the
charge applies whenever the cross-racial nature of the identification is relevant.193 The trial court, Boone held, “should not engage in a weight analysis as to the quantitative degree of risk of misidentification at this threshold stage.”194
Boone correctly holds that regardless of corroboration of the eyewitness identification, jurors must be educated about its reliability. Relevancy is the touchstone. The same logic covers the right to present identification experts. The government cannot ask the jury to consider
identification evidence while simultaneously shielding it from attack.
Any decent commitment to fair play bars that one-sided approach.
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